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I. INTRODUCTION
Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
("Vienna Convention"),' a multilateral treaty ratified by the United States in
1969, foreign nationals who are arrested or detained abroad must be advised
of their right to consular notification and access.2 The United States has
vigorously advocated the enforcement of Article 36 when dealing with
American citizens detained abroad.3 However, in connection with some of
the arrests and detentions arising from the September 11 attacks,4 several
I Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
2 Id. at art. 36.
3 Kelly Trainer, Comment, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in the United
States Courts, 13 TRANSNAT'L LAW 227, 230 (2000); see S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, For-
eigners on Texas's Death Row and the Right of Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 719, 728-
29 (1995); Ronald L. Hanna, Comment, Consular Access to Detained Foreign Nationals: An
Overview of the Current Application of the Vienna Convention in Criminal Practice, 25 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 163, 166 (2000). Last year, this commitment to the enforcement of Article 36 was manifested
during the apparent detention of a five-year-old American child by Chinese authorities for twenty-
six days. See Robert Kagan, The Politics of Torture, WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2001, at A25 (quoting
a State Department spokesman that "if a child [, who was a U.S. citizen.] was detained for 20 days
without access to his parents, without the benefit of consular notification, that would be a real
problem for us.").
4 Approximately one month after the September 11 attacks, it was reported in the press that
the government had arrested or detained 614 persons. See Jim McGee & Dan Eggen, Probe Fo-
cuses on 220 Detained After Attacks, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2001, at Al. This figure included 165
persons detained on immigration violations and an undisclosed number as material witnesses. Id.
By early November 2001, the amount climbed to 1,182 persons, at which time the government
announced that it would no longer issue running tallies of the number of people detained. See
Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, U.S. To Stop Issuing Detention Tallies, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2001,
at A16. During that month, it was further reported that approximately 600 persons remained in
federal custody. See Dan Eggen, About 600 Still Detained In Connection With Attacks, Ashcroft
Says, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at A15. Of these, 104 apparently have been charged with
criminal offenses; only 10 or 11 of them, however, were believed to have any relation to al Qaeda,
the terrorist organization headed by Osama bin Laden which the United States holds responsible
for the attacks on September 11, 2001. See David Firestone & Christopher Drew, Al Qaeda Link
Seen In Only A Handful of 1,200 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at Al. The remainder
were being held on immigration violations. Dan Eggen, Many Held On Tenuous Ties To Sept. 11,
WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2001, at A18. In June 2002, it was reported in the press that at least 147
persons detained as part of the post-September 11 investigation were still in government custody.
Christopher Newton, Justice Department Reveals 147 People Still Held in Connection to Septem-
ber 11 Investigation, Assoc. PRESS, June 14, 2002, available at WL, ALLNEWSPLUS. Of those
147 persons, 74 were being held on immigration related charges and 73 on criminal charges, or
violations related to the September 11 investigation. Id.
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CONSULAR NOTIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 36
foreign governments reportedly raised "strong protests" about the failure of
the State Department to notify them promptly about the apprehension of
their citizens. 5 The State Department, for its part, has maintained that the
government is living up to its obligations under the Vienna Convention.6
The prosecution of a foreign national in connection with violations
of American criminal law raises a number of questions with respect to the
consular notification provision of the Vienna Convention. First, does a for-
eign national have standing under the law to assert a violation by the U.S.
government of the notification and access provision? If so, what remedies, if
any, are available to redress a violation of Article 36? For example, can a
voluntary statement given by a defendant who has waived his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona 7 be suppressed if he was not advised of his rights to con-
sular notification and access under Article 36? What about the indictment?
Is it subject to dismissal for such a violation? Is a conviction susceptible to
being overturned because of an Article 36 violation on direct appeal or col-
5 See Canadian Detained in U.S. Jail Moved to Another Facility, Ottawa to Seek Answers,
CAN. PRESS, Jan. 3, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, News Group File; John Donnelly & Wayne
Washington, Diplomats Fault Lack of U.S. Notice on Many Detainees, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1,
2001, at Al. Following the September 11 attacks, the government interviewed approximately
5,000 Middle Eastern men on tourist, student and business visas. See Danny Hakim, Inquiries Put
Mideast Men In Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at B 10; Greg Winter, FBI Visits Provoke
Waves of Worry in Middle Eastern Men, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at B . These voluntary
interviews did not trigger any concerns under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention. See generally
United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 79 (D. Mass. 1999) ("[A] routine Customs
inspection is not the sort of situation that will trigger the consular notification provision of the
Convention.").
6 See Shannan McCaffrey, Diplomats Complain of Secrecy Surrounding Detainees from
Their Countries, CHICAGO TRIB., Jan. 1, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2607744. For example, in a
case involving a Canadian citizen where Canadian officials insisted on proof that he had declined
the right to have Canadian consul notified of the arrest, the State Department released copies of a
document where the detained national had marked "no" beside the question captioned "Do you
want us to notify your country's consular officials?" Robert Russo, U.S. Administration Goes To
"Unusual" Lengths To Prove Canadian Legally Held, CAN. PRESS, Jan. 9, 2002, available at
2002 WL 5763113. See generally DeNeen L. Brown & Dan Eggen, U.S. Holding Canadian In
Embassy Bomb Plot, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2002, at A20 (reporting that Canadian officials had
delivered a diplomatic note to the State Department requesting information about the status of a
Canadian citizen being held as a material witness in connection with a plot to blow up the Israeli
and American embassies in Singapore and whether he wanted to meet with Canadian consul);
Tom Jackman, Terror Suspect Allowed To Seek Foreign Aid, WASH. POST, July 18, 2002, at B2
(reporting that French consular officials were scheduled to meet with Zacarias Moussaoui, the
only person to date facing prosecution directly related to the September 11 attacks, "in response to
his request for help in defending himself against charges that he was part of the Sept. 11 conspir-
acy").
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda provides that before questioning a suspect who is in cus-
tody, law enforcement must inform the suspect that: (i) he has the right to remain silent; (ii) any
statement he makes may be used against him at trial; (iii) he has the right to be represented by an
attorney during questioning; and (iv) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for
him. Id. at 478-79.
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lateral attack?
This article responds to these questions and discusses the emerging
federal criminal case law with respect to the consular notice provision of the
Vienna Convention when a foreign national is arrested or detained.8 First,
the article provides a general overview on the history of the Vienna Conven-
tion. The article then addresses the consular notification provision found in
Article 36, the regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice affect-
ing consular notification, and the guidance which has been provided about
such notification by the Department of State. The article concludes with a
discussion of how federal courts have analyzed challenges to criminal prose-
cutions for failure to comply with the consular notification requirement.
II. CONSULAR RELATIONS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION
Protecting nationals through the auspices of "consular personnel9 is
an ancient tradition1 ° recognized as fundamental to international law."'1 In
1963, existing international law on consular relations was codified by ninety-
two nations by adopting the multilateral treaty of the Vienna Convention.
12
8 The Vienna Convention addresses numerous aspects of consular functions. This article
focuses on Article 36, which is entitled "Communication and contact with nationals of the sending
State." Also, except for a brief discussion of state prisoners seeking relief through federal habeas
corpus, this article is concerned with the impact of a violation of the consular notification provi-
sion of Article 36 in federal (and not state) criminal prosecutions. See infra Part V.B.4..
9 A consul has been defined as "an officer or agent accredited by his government to reside in
a foreign country for multifarious purposes, but primarily, to represent, promote, and protect its
commercial interests and those of its citizens or subjects." Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations: A Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 565,
568 n.8 (1997) (quoting JULIUS I. PUENTE, THE FOREIGN CONSUL: HIS JUDICIAL STATUS IN THE
UNITED STATES 11 (1926)); see Gregory Dean Gisvold, Note, Strangers in a Strange Land: As-
sessing the Fate of Foreign Nationals Arrested in the United States by State and Local Authori-
ties, 78 MINN. L. REv. 771, 778 (1994) ("Consuls function as agents of their respective States,
residing abroad to expedite and safeguard their government's interests.") (footnote omitted).
10 The roots of consular relations "can be traced to the city-states of ancient Greece. The
Greek prostates acted as intermediaries between Greek colonists and local governments. As an
effective political institution, however, the consul did not truly develop until the dawning of the
commercial age during the early Middle Ages." William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257,
262 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
I1 Howard S. Schiffman, Breard and Beyond: The Status of Consular Notification and Access
Under the Vienna Convention, 8 CARDOzO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 27, 32 (2000) (footnote omitted).
12 Kadish, supra note 9, at 568. One commentator has explained the history of the Vienna
Convention as follows:
In 1949, the International Law Commission designated the subject of consular
relations as an area ripe for codification. However, it did not begin examining
the issue until 1955. After several years of study, the International Law
Commission adopted the Draft Articles on Consular Relations on July 7,
[Vol. 105
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In 1969, this 79-article treaty was ratified by the United States. 3
The delay stemmed from concern over whether, given that the treaty met
"only 'minimum standards' for rules governing consular relations,"' 4 the
United States should instead continue negotiating bilateral agreements.
5
Eventually, however, ratification of the treaty was sought because the Nixon
Administration "believe[d] the agreement 'constitute[d] an important contri-
bution to the development and codification of international law and should
contribute to the orderly and effective conduct of consular relations between
States."",
16
To date, the Vienna Convention has been ratified by 160 countries.
1 7
Further, it has been noted that "[b]ecause of the difference in political and
economic systems represented at the meeting, the Vienna Convention is con-
sidered the most expansive agreement on the subject of consular relations."'
' 8
1961. Subsequently, the General Assembly announced that it would convene
a conference to prepare an international agreement on consular relations. The
United Nations Conference on Consular Relations met in Vienna, Austria,
from March 4 until April 22, 1963. Over ninety countries as well as several
international organizations attended the Conference. On April 24, 1963, the
Conference adopted the Vienna Convention and two optional protocols.
Aceves, supra note 10, at 263 (footnotes omitted); see also Trainer, supra note 3, at 231-32 (dis-
cussing history of the Vienna Convention); Gisvold, supra note 9, at 780 (same).
13 See Aceves, supra note 10, at 268 ("The Senate ... approved the Vienna Convention on
October 22, 1969, and it was formally ratified by President Nixon on November 12, 1969.") (foot-
note omitted).
14 Kadish, supra note 9, at 568-69 (footnote omitted).
15 See Cara S. O'Driscoll, Comment, The Execution of Foreign Nationals in Arizona: Viola-
tions of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 323, 326 n.20 (2000);
Kadish, supra note 9, at 568-69. As noted by Senator Fulbright:
The committee was told that the delay was largely due to a disagreement
within the executive branch between those who advocated continuing the tra-
ditional U.S. bilateral argument approach to consular conventions or following
the multilateral one represented by the Vienna Convention .... The multilat-
eral versus bilateral points up a basic characteristic of the Vienna Convention.
It embodies those standards upon which the 92 nations represented at the con-
ference could agree. In many ways, these are minimum standards - not as
high as those embodied in our bilateral treaties.
115 CONG. REc. S30953 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1969).
16 Aceves, supra note 10, at 268 (quoting Ex. E, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at VII (Statement of
Secretary of State William Rogers) (1969)).
17 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Pub. No. 10518, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS:
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER OFFICERS
REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE RIGHTS OF CONSULAR OFFICIALS
To ASSIST THEM, at 51-57 (1998) [hereinafter, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS], available
at http://www.state.gov /consulnotify.html.
18 O'Driscoll, supra note 15, at 326 (footnote omitted); see Victor M. Uribe, Consuls at Work:
20021
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The State Department has stated that "Article 36 obligations are 'of the high-
est order and should not be dealt with lightly."'" 9
III. ARTICLE 36 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION
The Vienna Convention recognizes that to facilitate the exercise of
consular functions, 20 communication with the nationals 21 of the sending state
is essential. 22 To that end, Article 36(1)(a) provides that "consular officers
shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have
access to them., 23 Conversely, "[n]ationals of the sending State shall have
the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular
officers of the sending State. 24
One important consular protection concerns assistance to a foreign
national who has been arrested abroad. 25 A key provision of Article 36 obli-
gates the receiving State to notify the national of a sending State2 6 who has
Universal Instruments of Human Rights and Consular Protection in the Context of Criminal Jus-
tice, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 375, 384 (1997) ("[Tlhe 1963 Vienna Convention is the most important
instrument on consular relations to date.") (footnote omitted); see also Hanna, supra note 3, at 165
("Because of its comprehensive nature and near universal applicability, the Vienna Convention
now establishes the 'baseline' for most obligations with respect to the treatment of foreign nation-
als in the United States, and for treatment of U.S. citizens abroad by foreign governments.") (foot-
note omitted).
19 Gisvold, supra note 9, at 793 (quoting ARTHUR W. ROVINE, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST
OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161 (1973)); O'Driscoll, supra note 15, at
340 (same).
20 Article 5 identifies thirteen categories of consular functions. Vienna Convention, supra
note 1, at art. 5, 9M (a)-(m). The last is a catch-all provision that authorizes the performance of any
other functions entrusted to a consular post by the sending State "which are not prohibited by the
laws and regulations of the receiving State or to which no objection is taken by the receiving State
or which are referred to in the international agreements in force between the sending State and the
receiving State." Id. at art. 5, 1 (m). One commentator has noted that "[in the cases of protection
of nationals, the flexibility granted by this provision proves to be fundamental." Uribe, supra note
18, at 386.
21 A foreign national, for purposes of the United States' obligations under the Vienna Conven-
tion, is any person who is not an American citizen. CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND AccESS, supra
note 17, at 18. A foreign national thus includes an illegal alien, as well as a lawful permanent
resident. Id.
22 See Aceves, supra note 10, at 264.
23 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 36, 1 (a).
24 Id.
25 Shank & Quigley, supra note 3, at 727-28.
26 Under the provisions of the treaty, the "sending State" is the country of the arrested foreign
national and the "receiving State" is the arresting country. United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara,
226 F.3d 616, 620 n.1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000).
[Vol. 105
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been arrested, placed in custody, or otherwise detained,27 that he has the
right to have his consul notified, "without delay," of such arrest or deten-
tion.28 Specifically, Article 36(1)(b) states:
if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the send-
ing State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is
arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is
detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed
to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or
detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without
delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph[.]
29
The State Department has interpreted this provision 30 to require noti-
fication to the foreign national "as soon as reasonably possible under the
circumstances" 3' and suggested that officials comply with this requirement,
where the arrest is followed by detention, by notifying the foreign national
27 The Vienna Convention does not define the terms arrest, custody, or detention. Those
terms, however, are defined in the Department of State's Foreign Affairs Manual. Kadish, supra
note 9, at 570 n.19 (citing to manual and defining terms).
28 One commentator has observed that while some treaties pre-dating the Vienna Convention
"recognize and provide for the obligation of the receiving state to notify the sending state when a
national is detained, any provisions obligating them to notify the detainee of their right to consult
with their consular authorities are conspicuously absent. That fight seems to appear in the Vienna
Convention." Schiffman, supra note 11, at 33; see also Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester,
Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 147, 154 (1999) ("Although prior customary interna-
tional law embodied many of the rights included in the Vienna Convention, there is little evidence
that the duty to inform was among them.") (footnote omitted).
29 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 36, l(b). In addition to the Vienna Convention,
the United States has entered into bilateral agreements with a number of countries which "require
that consular officials be notified of the arrest and/or detention of one of their nationals regardless
of their national's request." CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND AccEss, supra note 17, at 43.
30 The State Department's interpretation of a treaty's provision is entitled to deference. See,
e.g., El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) ("Respect is ordi-
narily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an interna-
tional treaty."); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982) ("Al-
though not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight."); Kolovrat v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) ("[T]he meaning given [treaties] by the departments of government
particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.").
31 See United States v. Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1005 (D. Minn. 1999) (finding violation
of Article 36 where government failed to advise Mexican national of his rights to consular notifi-
cation until two days after he was arrested, absent any evidence that earlier notification would not
have been reasonably possible).
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of his right to consular notification before he is booked. 32 If the person ar-
rested or otherwise detained has requested consular notification, the State
Department has further opined that "within 24 hours and certainly 72 hours"
notification must be provided. 33 Nothing in the provisions of Article 36 con-
fer on a foreign national the right to speak with a consular representative
before government agents commence an interrogation, 34 nor to delay an in-
terrogation if the foreign national requests that consul be notified of the ar-
rest.35
With respect to the right of consular officers to visit, correspond and
converse with a national who has been arrested, placed in custody, or is oth-
erwise detained, Article 36(l)(c) provides:
consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse
and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representa-
tion. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their dis-
trict in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular offi-
cers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who
is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such
action.36
Finally, Article 36(2) provides that the rights set forth under the first
paragraph "shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regula-
tions must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights
32 CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND AccEss, supra note 17, at 20; United States v. Alvarado-
Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (S.D. Cal. 1999), affid, 230 F.3d 1368 (table) (9th Cir. 2000).
33 CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND AccEss, supra note 17, at 20.
34 See United States v. Ore-Irawa, 78 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613 (E.D. Mich. 1999) ("[N]othing in
... Article 36 ... requires that an arresting officer inform a defendant of his rights under the Vi-
enna Convention immediately upon arrest or before requesting consent to search."); Alvarado-
Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 991 ("[Tlhe convention does not confer upon foreign nationals the right
to speak with a consular representative before agents begin interrogation.").
35 Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 991; see United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178,
184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("[T]here is no requirement in the Convention that the interrogation of a
foreign national must stop when he is told of Article 36's consular notification provision.");
United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1126 (C.D. II1. 1999), affd, 226 F.3d
616 (7th Cir. 2000). Some commentators have noted that the State Department's interpretation of
the Vienna Convention providing the arresting state twenty-four to seventy-two hours to contact
the consulate after the foreign national has requested notification "seriously undercuts claims that
consular presence is a prerequisite to continued interrogation." Luna & Sylvester, supra note 28,
at 152.
36 Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 36 T 1 (c).
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accorded under this Article are intended., 37 While this subparagraph provides in
part that the laws of the receiving State must allow for these rights to be given
full effect, it has been suggested that "[t]he intention of this subparagraph seems
to be to insure that the domestic criminal procedures of the receiving State are
interfered with to the least extent possible.
IV. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REGULATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVICE RELATING TO THE CONSULAR NOTIFICATION PROVISION OF THE
VIENNA CONVENTION
To ensure compliance with the consular notification provision of Article
36 of the Vienna Convention, the Department of Justice issued regulations to the
same effect.39 Specifically, 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 states, in relevant part:
(a) This statement is designed to establish a uniform procedure
for consular notification where nationals of foreign countries
are arrested by officers of this Department on charges of crimi-
nal violations. It conforms to practice under international law
and in particular implements obligations undertaken by the
United States pursuant to treaties with respect to the arrest and
detention of foreign nationals. Some of the treaties obligate the
United States to notify the consular official only upon the de-
mand or request of the arrested foreign national. On the other
hand, some of the treaties require notifying the consul of the ar-
rest of a foreign national whether or not the arrested person re-
quests such notification.
(1) In every case in which a foreign national is arrested the ar-
resting officer shall inform the foreign national that his consul
will be advised of his arrest unless he does not wish such notifi-
cation to be given. If the foreign national does not wish to have
his consul notified, the arresting officer shall also inform him
that in the event there is a treaty in force between the United
States and his country which requires such notification, his con-
sul must be notified regardless of his wishes and, if such is the
37 Id. at art. 36 2.
38 Schiffman, supra note 11, at 39 (footnote omitted).
39 See United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Kadish, supra
note 9, at 576 ("The Department of Justice promulgated [2]8 C.F.R. § 50.5 to implement, in part,
Article 36 in federal cases."). But see Molora Vadnis, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument
Against Judicial Involvement in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 47
UCLA L. REV. 307, 318 (1999) ("Although these regulations were intended to ensure compliance
with international treaties other than the Vienna Convention, the regulations satisfy the notice
requirement of Article 36.") (footnote omitted).
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case, he will be advised of such notification by the U.S. Attor-
ney.
(2) In all cases (including those where the foreign national has
stated that he does not wish his consul to be notified) the local
office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the local Mar-
shal's office, as the case may be, shall inform the nearest U.S.
Attorney of the arrest and of the arrested person's wishes re-
garding consular notification.4°
The regulations further assign the U.S. Attorney the obligation to notify foreign
consul.4'
The Department of State also has undertaken a number of initiatives to
alert local and federal law enforcement officials about the consular notification
requirements under Article 36.42 These measures have included issuing periodic
notices to local governments explaining the requirements, the issuance of a
handbook, and the release of a bulletin outlining the provisions of the Vienna
Convention.43
The most recent comprehensive publication by the Department of
State regarding consular notification was issued in 1998. 44 This publication
contains guidance and instructions relating to the detention, arrest, or death
of, or the appointment of guardians for foreign nationals, as well as other
issues concerning the provision of consular services to foreign nationals in
the United States.45 The publication notes that the obligations surrounding
consular notification and access are binding on the federal government by
virtue of the Supremacy Clause. 46
40 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2001). This section does not apply to arrests made by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service ("INS") "in administrative expulsion or exclusion proceedings," since
the INS has its own regulations governing notification. Id. § 50.5(b); see 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e)
(2002). As to arrests made by INS with respect to criminal violations of the immigration laws, the
regulations provide that the "U.S. Marshal, upon delivery of the foreign national into his custody,
shall be responsible for informing the U.S. Attorney of the arrest[.]" 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(b).
41 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(3).
42 See Trainer, supra note 3, at 239-40.
43 See Aceves, supra note 10, at 274-75; Hanna, supra note 3, at 169; Trainer, supra note 3, at
239.
44 See Luna & Sylvester, supra note 28, at 188 ("As part of a 'massive effort' in 1998 to in-
crease awareness, the State Department promulgated a handbook detailing the treatment detained
foreign nationals should receive under the Vienna Convention."); Schiffman, supra note 11, at 56-
57 ("The U.S. State Department took a substantial step in January 1998 with the publication of its
manual, 'Consular Notification and Access[.]'); see also supra note 17.
45 CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND AccEss, supra note 17, at 13-15.
46 Id. at 44.
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V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION TO CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
As noted previously, Article 36 imposes three separate but interre-
lated obligations on the host country relating to a detained foreign national:
"(1) a detainee's right to contact a consul; (2) a consul's right to contact the
detainee; and (3) a detainee's right to be informed by the detaining authori-
ties of the right to contact a consul., 47 In the last twenty-five years, the third
of these obligations has been the subject of frequent litigation in the context
of criminal prosecutions.
The scenario is straightforward. A foreign national is arrested. He is
advised of his rights under Miranda,48 but not of his right, under the Vienna
Convention, to contact his consulate. 49 The defendant waives his Miranda
rights and provides a statement. A challenge then is made at trial to suppress
the statement and/or dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the govern-
ment failed to advise the defendant of his right to consular notification and
access under Article 36. The district court denies such relief, a conviction
ensues, and the defendant challenges the conviction on appeal on similar
grounds. Before turning to an analysis of the developing case law in this
area, it is important to discuss generally certain legal principles governing
treaties and their enforceability in federal courts by private individuals.
A. The Supremacy Clause, Treaties, and the Self-Execution Doctrine
Article VI of the United States Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
Which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State notwithstanding.5°
Since treaties are the "Law of the Land," courts must give them the same
consideration as they do federal statutes.51 Indeed, under the Supremacy
47 Shank & Quigley, supra note 3, at 729 (footnote omitted).
48 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see supra note 7.
49 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at art. 36 1 (b).
50 U.S. CONST. art VI, § 2.
51 See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the Constitution a treaty is placed
on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation."); The Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) ("A treaty... is a law of the land as [is] an act of Congress...
."). See generally Uribe, supra note 18, at 407 ("The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
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Clause, "treaty-based rights are superior to State laws or policies and even
trump earlier inconsistent federal legislation., 52 But are such treaty-based
rights privately enforceable by an individual? This turns on the doctrine of
self-execution, described by one court as "one of the most confounding ques-
tions" in treaty law.53
It has been suggested that two distinct questions must be "resolve[d]
in determining whether a treaty is self-executing: (1) whether the treaty re-
quires implementing additional legislation before it can take effect; and (2)
whether the treaty confers private enforceable rights to individuals. 54 As to
the former, the evidence is compelling that the Vienna Convention requires
no additional congressional implementing legislation.55 With respect to the
latter, there is disagreement among both commentators
56 and the courts.5 7
was ratified by the United States, and therefore, has the status of 'supreme Law of the Land' and
is binding on federal and local authorities.").
52 Luna & Sylvester, supra note 28, at 154 (footnote omitted); see Schiffman, supra note 11, at
34 ("As supreme law, a treaty supersedes state law and policy.") (footnote omitted); Aceves,
supra note 10, at 289 ("Under th[e] doctrine [of posterior derogat priori], a treaty may be super-
seded by a subsequent act of Congress. Similarly, an act of Congress may be superseded by a
subsequent treaty."). A treaty, however, may not contradict the Constitution. See Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) ("This Court has regularly and uniformly recognized the supremacy of the
Constitution over a treaty.").
53 United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979); see Schiffman, supra note 11, at
35 ("The precise definition and application of self-executing treaties is a source of much contro-
versy and scholarly debate.") (footnote omitted).
54 Kadish, supra note 9, at 586-87 (footnotes omitted); see Luna & Sylvester, supra note 28, at
155 (discussing how treaties are deemed self-executing if the following two prongs are met:
"First, the treaty must not require implementing legislation to take effect .... The second limit
concerns the enumeration of interested parties .... Generally, courts will only allow individuals
to bring claims where the language of the treaty specifically and directly evinces an intent to 'con-
fer[] rights on individuals.") (footnote omitted); Vadnis, supra note 39, at 315-16 ("The self-
executing nature of the Vienna Convention should not be confused with the issue of invocability.
Invocability refers to the question whether even though a rule of an international agreement is
directly applied, a particular party can rely on this rule as 'law' in his particular case.") (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 67 (1st Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 956 (2000) (Selya and Boudin, J., concurring) ("The label 'self-executing'
usually is applied to any treaty that according to its terms takes effect upon ratification and re-
quires no separate implementing statute. Whether the terms of such a treaty provide for private
rights, enforceable in domestic courts, is a wholly separate question.") (footnote omitted).
55 See Kadish, supra note 9, at 588; Luna & Sylvester, supra note 28, at 155 ("In the case of
the Vienna Convention, the evidence is overwhelming that its obligations require no implementing
domestic legislation. According to a White House official in 1969, the Convention is 'entirely
self-executi[ng] and does not require any implementing or complementing legislation."') (footnote
omitted); CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND AcCESS, supra note 17, at 44 ("Implementing legislation
is not necessary . . . because executive, law enforcement and judicial authorities can implement
these obligations through their existing powers.").
56 Compare Trainer, supra note 3, at 257 ( "The language of the Vienna Convention confers a
private right to sue when a foreign defendant is not given notification of his right to contact his
consulate. To argue that an individual does not have standing to enforce Article 36 is to ignore the
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In Breard v. Greene,58 the Supreme Court observed in dicta that Ar-
ticle 36 "arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance
following arrest[.] ' 59 As a general matter, however, "international treaties,
as agreements among sovereign nations, do not create individual rights that
are enforceable by an individual[,] '"6 even when they benefit such a private
party. 61 In any event, as discussed below, the majority of courts have by-
passed this question and proceeded directly to an analysis of the appropriate
remedy for a violation of Article 36.
language of the Treaty.") with Vadnis, supra note 39, at 315 ("Evidence suggests that the Senate
never intended to confer such a right on arrested foreign nationals."); James A. Deeken, A New
Miranda For Foreign Nationals? The Impact of Federalism on International Treaties that Place
Affirmative Obligations on State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United States, 31 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 997, 1022 (1998) (Arguing that interpreting the Convention "as granting personal
rights would run against the resumption that international treaties do not create such rights. It also
seems contrary to the language of the treaty, which indicates that the purpose of the Vienna Con-
vention was to aid relations between countries and not to benefit individuals.") (footnotes omit-
ted). See generally, Schiffman, supra note 11, at 37-42 (citing cases and discussing whether the
Vienna Convention was meant to create personal rights).
57 Compare United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672, 678 (D.V.I. 1999) ("The text of
the Vienna Convention, the recorded intentions of its drafters, and the prevailing view among
federal agencies and courts leads this Court to conclude that, as a detained alien, [defendant] ha[d]
standing to seek relief for INS' alleged violation of Vienna Convention Article 36, paragraph
1(b).") with United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The preamble to the
Vienna Convention supports the view that the Convention created no judicially enforceable indi-
vidual rights .... Moreover, paragraph 1 of Article 36 itself specifically states that the provisions
of that Article are framed '[w]ith a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating
to nationals of the sending State."') (footnote omitted) (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 1,
at art. 36 1).
58 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
59 Id. at 376. At the same time, the Supreme Court noted that "neither the text nor the history
of the Vienna Convention clearly provides a foreign nation a private right of action in United
States' courts to set aside a criminal conviction and sentence for violation of consular notification
provisions." Id. at 377. This has led one commentator to remark that "[i]f the ability to assert a
private right of action under a treaty is suspect for a member state, the rights of an individual
criminal defendant to request relief must be viewed with even greater suspicion." Schiffman,
supra note 11, at 39 (footnote omitted).
60 United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
1026 (2000); accord United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532
U.S. 1056 (2001).
61 See Garza v. Lappin, 253 F.3d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[A]s a general rule, international
agreements, even those benefitting private parties, do not create private rights enforceable in do-
mestic courts."); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 195 n.3 (5th Cir. 2001) ("[E]ven
where a treaty provides certain benefits for nationals of a particular state ... it is traditionally held
that any rights arising out of such provisions are... those of the state and... individual rights are
only derivative through the states."') (quoting United States v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir.
1975)); De La Pava, 268 F.3d at 164 (same); Li, 206 F.3d at 61 (same).
2002]
13
Iraola: Federal Criminal Prosecutions and the Right to Consular Notificat
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2002
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
B. The Evolving Federal Criminal Case Law
Challenges by criminal defendants to the government's failure to ad-
vise them of their right to consular notification under Article 36 of the Vi-
enna Convention upon arrest are reported in numerous district court cases
addressing denials of motions to dismiss indictments and/or suppress state-
ments, federal circuit court opinions reviewing convictions on direct appeal,
and also district and circuit court opinions addressing collateral attacks to
convictions. Since some of the first reported federal criminal cases that dis-
cussed the issue of consular notification (albeit in the context of the INS's
regulations providing for the same62) concerned prosecutions for illegal reen-
try into the United States, and because the analysis in those cases has been
applied subsequently by some courts when addressing Article 36 challenges
in non-immigration related prosecutions, those cases are examined first.
1. Consular Notification Challenges Involving INS Regulations in
Prosecutions for Illegal Reentry After Deportation
In United States v. Calderon-Medina,63 which involved a consoli-
dated appeal, the government contested the dismissal of indictments against
two defendants charging them with illegal reentry after deportation under 8
U.S.C. § 1326. 64 The district courts in those cases ruled that the INS's viola-
tion of its regulation concerning consular notification 65 rendered the original
deportations unlawful. 66 The district courts further reasoned that, because
the offense of illegal reentry after deportation required that there be a valid
prior deportation, an element of the offense was lacking and the indictments
consequently were dismissed.67
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the rationale of the district
courts that "conformity with applicable laws and regulations must be judged
without inquiry into the prejudice caused to the defendant." 68 To the con-
62 See supra note 40.
63 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
64 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) provides for criminal penalties in connection with the reentry of certain
removed aliens.
65 See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (then known as 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e)). At the time Calderon-Medina
was decided, 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e) stated: "Every detained alien shall be notified that he may com-
municate with the consular or diplomatic officers of the country of his nationality." 8 C.F.R. §
242.2(e) (1979).
66 Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 530.
67 See generally United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 864 (1980) ("In order to convict a defendant for a violation of § 1326, the prior deporta-
tion must have been lawful.").
68 Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 530.
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trary, the court ruled that "[vliolation of a regulation renders a deportation
unlawful only if the violation prejudiced interests of the [defendant] alien
which were protected by the regulation." 69 Since no finding of prejudice had
been made by the district courts below, the cases were remanded so that the
defendants were "allowed the opportunity to demonstrate prejudice resulting
from the INS regulation violations," and the district courts, in turn, were
given the chance to determine whether the violation of the regulation
"harmed the [defendant] aliens' interests in such a way as to affect poten-
tially the outcome of their deportation proceedings.' 7 °
On remand, in United States v. Rangel-Gonzales,7 1 one of the two
cases in the consolidated appeal, the district court found no prejudice. 72 Ap-
plying the standard set forth in Calderon-Medina, the Ninth Circuit in
Rangel-Gonzales reversed the ruling of the district court and found that the
defendant had made a credible demonstration of prejudice because
[he] showed he did not know of his right to contact the consular
officials, that he would have done so had he known, and that
such consultation may well have led not merely to appointment
of counsel, but also to community assistance in creating a more
favorable record to present to the immigration judge on the
question of deportation.73
As a result, the court ruled that the indictment should be dismissed.74
Both Rangel-Gonzales and Calderon-Medina involved collateral at-
69 Id. at 531 (footnote omitted). In United States v. Floulis, 457 F. Supp. 1350 (W.D. Pa.
1978), decided prior to Calderon-Medina, the district court held that the INS's failure to advise
defendant of his right to consular notification under its regulation could not be deemed "critical to
the fundamental fairness of the hearing" so as to justify dismissal of the indictment for illegal
reentry after deportation, where the defendant "was represented by counsel at the deportation
hearing." Floulis, 457 F. Supp. at 1355.
70 Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 532; accord United States v. Arambula-Alvarado, 677 F.2d
51, 53 (9th Cir. 1982).
71 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980).
72 ld. at 530.
73 Id. at 531; see Linda J. Springrose, Strangers In A Strange Land: The Rights of Non-
Citizens Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
185, 192 (1999) (discussing evidence of prejudice presented and how the affidavit from the ex-
perienced immigration attorney "seems to have been the key for providing prejudice in th[e]
case."); Trainer, supra note 3, at 243-44 (same). As subsequently explained by the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Cerda-Pena, 799 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1986), this standard "requires that an
alien [defendant] produce some concrete evidence indicating that the violation of a procedural
protection actually had the potential for affecting the outcome of his or her deportation proceed-
ings." Id. at 1379.
74 Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 533.
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tacks on deportations75 and were decided in the context of the INS regulation
76implementing the Vienna Convention. As discussed below, their analysis
with respect to prejudice has been used by some courts when confronting
consular notification claims directly under Article 36.
2. Consular Notification Challenges Under Article 36 During the
Pendency of a Prosecution
The district courts which have entertained motions to dismiss the in-
dictment and/or suppress statements on the grounds that the defendants were
not advised of their right to consular notification have ruled, almost uni-
formly, that neither of those remedies is appropriate. 77  In doing so, the dis-
75 At the time Rangel-Gonzales and Calderon-Medina were decided, "[t]he issue of collateral
attacks on deportations in subsequent proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 was far from settled
law[.]" Kadish, supra note 9, at 572. n.34. In United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828
(1987), the Supreme Court held that due process requires courts to permit a collateral attack on a
deportation order in a prosecution under § 1326 where the error in the administrative proceeding
has denied the alien judicial review of the order of deportation. Kadish, supra note 9, at 575.
Following Mendoza-Lopez, courts have found, in the context of prosecutions for illegal reentry,
that a violation of the INS regulation on consular notification does not deprive a defendant of
judicial review or render the proceeding fundamentally unfair. See, e.g., United States v. Villa-
Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v.
Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 594-95 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Chairez, 875 F.
Supp. 609, 617-19 (D. Neb. 1994); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (addressing limitation on collateral
attack on underlying deportation order).
76 Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 530 ("[The regulation] was intended to insure compliance
with this country's treaty obligations to promote assistance from their country of origin for aliens
facing deportation proceedings in the United States."); Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 531 ("The
regulation admittedly violated here was evidently intended to ensure compliance with the Vienna
Convention[."); see also Kadish, supra note 9, at 572-73.
77 See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 17, 40 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (motion to dismiss
indictment); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1038 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (same);
United States v. Martinez-Villalva, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155-56 (D. Colo. 1999) (motion to
suppress statement); United States v. Ore-Irawa, 78 F. Supp. 2d 610, 613-14 (E.D. Mich 1999)
(motion to suppress statement and/or dismiss indictment); United States v. Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d
854, 860-62 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff d, 269 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Rodri-
gues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 184-85 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (motion to suppress statement); United States
v. Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1005-07 (D. Minn. 1999) (same); United States v. Torres-Del
Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d 931, 933-35 (C.D. I11. 1999) (same); United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp.
2d 236, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); United States v. Kevin, No. 97 CR. 763 JGK, 1999 WL
194749, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. April 7, 1999) (motion to dismiss indictment); United States v. Alvarado-
Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993-95 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (motion to suppress statement and/or dismiss
indictment); United States v. Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1253-55 (D. Utah 1999) (mo-
tion to suppress statement); United States v. $69,530 in U.S. Currency, 22 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595
(W.D. Texas 1998) (same); United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1097 (S.D. Cal.
1998). One court has ruled that regardless of whether prejudice from a violation of the Vienna
Convention was shown, dismissal of a death penalty notice filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)
of the Federal Death Penalty Act, was not a remedy that could be imposed for such a violation.
United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 290, 295-96 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also United States
v. Beckford, 211 F.3d 1266 (table), 2000 WL 376155, at *13 (4th Cir. 2000) (affirming district
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trict courts have undertaken the following analysis.
The threshold question confronted by the courts revolves around
standing. Most courts have ruled that, irrespective of whether or not a for-
eign national has standing to raise an Article 36 violation,78 before such a
defendant would be entitled to seek a remedy such as dismissal of the in-
dictment or suppression of evidence, he must first demonstrate prejudice,
and in those cases, none was established.79 Some of the courts have formu-
lated the test for prejudice as requiring the defendant to demonstrate "(1) that
he did not know of his right to consular notification; (2) that he would have
availed himself of that right; and (3) that there was a likelihood that contact
with the consul would have resulted in assistance to him.",
80
Even when prejudice is shown, many of the district courts have ruled
that dismissal of the indictment or suppression of a defendant's statement are
not available legal remedies to cure the prejudice. 8' With respect to the dis-
missal of an indictment, courts have reasoned that the Vienna Convention
court's ruling denying motion to quash death penalty notice based on violation of Article 36 since
defendant "was not sentenced to death and he [did] not demonstrate[] how the failure would have
otherwise affected the outcome of the case.").
78 Some district courts have ruled that an individual has standing to assert rights under Article
36. See, e.g., United States v. Briscoe, 69 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745 (D.V.I. 1999); Torres-Del Muro,
58 F. Supp. 2d at 933; United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77-78 (D. Mass.
1999); Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 988-89; United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d
672, 678 (D.V.I. 1999); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (C.D. Ill.
1999); $69,530.00 in U.S. Currency, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 594. Other district courts have determined
that the issue is murky and either have assumed standing for purposes of discussion, or ruled that
it is not necessary to resolve the standing issue because the defendant has not established that he
would be entitled to the relief requested even if he had standing. See, e.g., Duarte-Acero, 132 F.
Supp. 2d at 1038; Martinez-Villalva, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1156; Ore-Irawa, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 614
n.2; Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 859; Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1006; Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d
at 181-183; Kevin, 1999 WL 194749, at *3; Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 278; Tapia-Mendoza, 41
F. Supp. 2d at 1253; Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1096.
79 See Martinez-Villalva, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 1155-56; Ore-Irawa, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 613; United
States v. Kurdyukov, 75 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664-65 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at
860; Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 182-85; Kevin, 1999 WL 194749, at *4; Miranda, 65 F. Supp.
2d at 1006; Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 989-93; Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1253;
Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 678; Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 1126; Esparza-Ponce, 7
F. Supp. 2d at 1096. But see Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 279 (concluding first that suppression
would not be a proper remedy but even if it were, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice); Tor-
res-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 933 (omitting any discussion of prejudice and proceeding directly
to remedy discussion).
80 Ore-Irawa, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 613; see Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1254; Briscoe, 69
F. Supp. 2d at 747; Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 990; Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d at
1097. This test has its roots in Rangel-Gonzales. See Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 531.
81 See Duarte-Acero, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1039; Kurdyukov, 75 F. Supp. 2d at 665; Carrillo, 70
F. Supp. 2d at 860; Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 185; Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 993-95;
Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1255.
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provides for no such extraordinary remedy,82 and that outside of the context
of cases charging illegal re-entry (and interpreting the INS regulation),83 no
reported decision has found that dismissal of the indictment would be an
appropriate remedy for a violation of Article 36.84 As to suppression of a
defendant's statement for failure to advise him of his right to consular notifi-
cation, courts have ruled that since the exclusionary rule generally is a rem-
edy available to prevent violations of individual constitutional rights, 85 and
since failure to satisfy the consular notification requirement does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation, 86 exclusion of evidence is not an ap-
propriate remedy.
87
82 See Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 860; Kevin, 1999 WL 194749, at *4.
83 See Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 529. With respect to the precedential value of Rangel-
Gonzales and Calderon-Medina, it is important to recognize that in United States v. Lombera-
Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 991 (2000), the Ninth
Circuit ruled that suppression of evidence obtained as the result of post-arrest interrogation was
not an appropriate remedy for a violation of the consular notification provision of Article 36. The
court pointed out how Rangel-Gonzales and Calderon-Medina had relied on the INS regulation
and stated that it did not have any occasion in those cases "to hold that the violation of the treaty
alone was sufficient to permit a foreign national to overturn a deportation." Lombera-
Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 885; see United States v. Cortez, 217 F.3d 847 (table), 2000 WL 559888
(9th Cir. 2000) (reversing district court's decision granting motion to suppress evidence obtained
in violation of Article 36 in light of Lombera-Camorlinga).
84 See Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 995 ("Unlike a charge of illegal reentry, agents'
failure to advise Defendant of her right to contact the consul cannot possibly 'nullify' an element
of the crimes charged.").
85 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (Fifth Amendment); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (Sixth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth
Amendment). See generally Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10 (1995) ("The exclusionary rule
operates as a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard against future violations of... [con-
stitutional] rights through the rule's general deterrent effect."); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960) ("[The] purpose [of the exclusionary rule] is to deter - to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way - by removing the incentive to disre-
gard it.").
86 See, e.g., Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 861 ("[A] violation of ... Article 36 does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation."); Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 185 ("[flailing to satisfy the
consular notification requirement of Article 36 does not rise to the level of a constitutional viola-
tion."); Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1006 ("[T]he rights that the Convention establishes do not rise
to the level of fundamental or constitutional rights."); Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 934
("[T]he failure to notify the foreign national of his right to speak with his consul, per se, does not
implicate constitutional rights."); Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 994 ("[Blecause the Conven-
tion does not implicate fundamental Constitutional rights, nor does it expressly provide for the
remedy of suppression, th[e] [c]ourt holds that suppression is not an appropriate remedy for its
violation.") (footnote omitted); Tapia-Mendoza, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 1254 (agreeing that Convention
"does not create constitutional rights"); $69,539 in U.S. Currency, 22 F. Supp.2d at 595 ("[A]
violation of a person's rights under the Vienna Convention does not trigger the exclusionary rule,
unless the violation also results in an infringement of the person's constitutional rights under the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments.")
87 See Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 861; Rodrigues, 68 F .Supp. 2d at 185; Torres-Del Muro, 58
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Some courts have determined that absent a showing of prejudice,
there is "no occasion to consider the remedy [of exclusion of evidence]."88
At least two others have intimated that suppression of a statement made dur-
ing arrest or detention may be an appropriate remedy if prejudice is shown.89
3. Consular Notification Challenges Under Article 36 on Direct
Appeal Following Conviction
The legal analysis undertaken by the circuit courts when confronting
challenges by defendants who seek to overturn their convictions because of
the government's failure to advise them of their right to consular notification
generally has tracked that of the district courts. Unlike the district courts,
however, some circuit courts have held that the Vienna Convention does not
create "judicially enforceable rights of consultation between a detained for-
eign national and his consular officer." 90 Other courts have found it unnec-
F. Supp. 2d at 933-34; Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 994; $69,539 in U.S. Currency, 22 F.
Supp.2d at 595; see also United States v. Enger, 472 F. Supp. 490, 545 (D.N.J. 1978) ("De-
clin[ing] to infer [exclusionary] rule from the Vienna Convention in the absence of a clear indica-
tion that the draftsmen of the Convention (and the executive branch of the United States at the
time this nation became a signatory) intended to engraft such a rule on the ... treaty.") (footnote
omitted).
88 United States v. Briscoe, 69 F. Supp.2d 738, 748 (D.V.I. 1999); see also Superville, 40 F.
Supp. 2d at 678 (declining to rule on whether prejudice from Article 36 violation must be demon-
strated before relief may be obtained because defendant was notified of his right to consular ac-
cess).
89 See Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 (defendant did "not ma[k]e the requisite showing of
prejudice in order to justify suppression of any statements made during his arrest and detention");
see also United States v. Kevin, No. 97 CR. 763 JGK, 1999 WL 194749, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. April 7,
1999) (rejecting dismissal of indictment as a remedy while noting that in other contexts, suppres-
sion of evidence has been found to be an appropriate remedy but in the case at bar, "there ha[d]
been no showing that the defendants have been prejudiced[.]"). It bears noting, however, that
Kevin was decided prior to the Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d
157 (2d Cir. 2001), which declined to hold that a criminal defendant had no standing to enforce
rights under the Vienna Convention and further ruled that even if he did, failure to comply with its
consular notification provision would not serve as appropriate grounds to dismiss an indictment.
Id. at 164-65.
90 United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Emueg-
buman, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001). In support of its ruling, the court in Emuegbuman
noted that it was significant that in Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111,
111-12 (1999) and Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377 (1998), the Supreme Court held that the
Vienna Convention did "not provide a signatory nation a private right of action in the federal
courts to seek a remedy for a violation of Article 36." Emuegbuman, 268 F.3d at 394. The court
stated: "If a foreign sovereign to whose benefit the Vienna Convention inures cannot seek a judi-
cial remedy, we cannot fathom how an individual foreign national can do so in the absence of
express language in the treaty." Id.; see also United States v. Santos, 235 F.3d 1105, 1109 (8th
Cir. 2000) (Beam, J., concurring) (concluding that Vienna Convention does not grant private
citizens enforceable rights in federal courts); United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66-67 (1st Cir.
2000) (Selya, J. & Boudin, J., concurring) (same).
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essary to determine whether the Vienna Convention creates a right to consu-
lar notification that is individually enforceable because even if it did, the
remedy for a violation of Article 36 can never be suppression of evidence or
dismissal of the indictment.
91
a. Dismissal of Indictment or Suppression of Evidence
In rejecting dismissal of the indictment as a remedy for a violation of
Article 36, the circuit courts have reasoned that such a remedy is extraordi-
nary and reserved for circumstances implicating fundamental rights which
are not at issue with respect to the consular notification provisions found in
Article 36.92 Similarly, with respect to the remedy of exclusion, "there is no
general exclusionary rule for international law violations[.]y 93  Further,
courts have ruled that since the rights, if any, created by Article 36 are not
"fundamental rights on par with the right to be free from unreasonable
searches, the privilege against self-incrimination, or the right to counsel[,]
' 94
exclusion of evidence is an appropriate remedy only if the treaty provides for
91 See De La Pava, 268 F.3d at 165 (dismissal of indictment); United States v. Minjares-
Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2001) (suppression of evidence); Li, 206 F.3d at 60 (sup-
pression of evidence or dismissal of the indictment); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 540 (6th
Cir. 2000) (suppression of evidence or dismissal of indictment); United States v. Chaparro-
Alcantara, 226 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 2000) (suppression of evidence); United States v. La-
wal, 231 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 U.S. 1165 (2001) (same); United
States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000) (suppression of evidence ob-
tained as the result of post-arrest interrogation); United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237,
1255-56 (10th Cir. 2000) (suppression of evidence); United States v. Cordoba-Mesquera, 212 F.3d
1194, 1196 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (suppression of evidence or the dismissal of an indictment); see also
Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 198-99 (rejecting suppression of evidence as a remedy after finding
that there was no enforceable right). See generally, Luna & Sylvester, supra note 28, at 179 ("It
would take an enormous leap in logic ... to argue that the signatories to the Vienna Convention
intended for violations to be cured by the exclusion of evidence or the dismissal of the indict-
ment.").
92 De La Pava, 268 F.3d at 165; Li, 206 F.3d at 62; Page, 232 F.3d at 540; see Cordoba-
Mosquera, 212 F.3d at 1196 (following Li).
93 Lawal, 231 F.3d at 1048; see Luna & Sylvester, supra note 28, at 178 ("In general, interna-
tional law, treaties, and norms do not require the exclusion of improperly obtained evidence.").
94 Li, 206 F.3d at 61 (citations omitted); see Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d at 986 ("Vienna Con-
vention does not create fundamental rights on par with those set forth in the Bill of Rights.");
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886 ("[T]his and other circuits have held in recent years that an
exclusionary rule is typically available only for constitutional violations."); United States v. Salas,
168 F.3d 484 (table), 1998 WL 911731, at *3 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[R]ights created by international
treaties do not create rights equivalent to constitutional rights."); see also Murphy v. Netherland,
116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[Elven if the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations could
be said to create individual rights (as opposed to setting out the rights and obligations of signatory
nations), it certainly does not create constitutional rights."); Waldron v. INS, 17 F.3d 511, 518 (2d
Cir. 1993) ("Although compliance with our treaty obligations clearly is required, we decline to
equate such a provision with fundamental rights.").
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such a remedy. 95 Of course, "there is no indication that the drafters of the
Vienna Convention had these 'uniquely American rights in mind, especially
given the fact that even the United States Supreme Court did not require
Fifth and Sixth Amendment post-arrest warnings until it decided Miranda in
1966, three years after the treaty was drafted." 9 6 Not surprisingly, "nothing
in the text of the Vienna Convention indicates that a remedy of suppression
is appropriate for violations of Article 36." 97 Furthermore, it has been noted
that the recognition of such a drastic remedy "not imposed by any other sig-
natory to th[e] convention, would promote disharmony in the interpretation
of an international agreement. 98
To the extent it could be argued that the language of Article 36 is
ambiguous, courts have found that the ratification history of the Vienna
Convention and its subsequent operation, including the interpretation given
to its provisions by the Department of State, all demonstrate that its direc-
tives with respect to consular notification are not individually enforceable. 99
In short, the only remedies for a violation of the consular notification provi-
95 See Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199 ("Absent an express provision in the treaty, the exclu-
sionary rule is an inappropriate sanction."); Li, 206 F.3d at 61 ("Defendants who assert violations
of a statute or treaty that does not create fundamental rights are not generally entitled to the sup-
pression of evidence unless that statute or treaty provides for such a remedy."); Page, 232 F.3d at
540 ("[A] treaty must be regarded as equivalent to an act of the legislature. Thus, as in the case of
a statutory violation, the exclusionary rule is an inappropriate sanction, absent any underlying
constitutional violations or rights, unless the treaty expressly provides for that remedy.") (citation
omitted); Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d at 621 ("[Als in the case of statutes, the exclusionary rule
is an appropriate sanction for a violation of a treaty provision only when the treaty provides for
that remedy."). See generally United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528 (1974) (discussing
how the exclusionary rule is applicable if constitutional violations are not involved if the statute so
provides).
96 Page, 232 F.3d at 541 (quoting Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886); accord Jimenez-
Nava, 243 F.3d at 198.
97 Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d at 621; see Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d at 986 ("As courts
reviewing the Vienna Convention have consistently recognized, the treaty does not expressly
incorporate a suppression remedy."); Page, 232 F.3d at 540 ("Upon examination of the express
provisions of the treaty, it is clear that nothing in the text requires suppression of evidence or
dismissal of the indictment for violations of Article 36."); Li, 206 F.3d at 62 (Noting that while the
Vienna Convention may be facially ambiguous on the subject of whether it creates individually
enforceable rights, it does "not... address whether those rights would justify suppression of evi-
dence or the dismissal of an indictment.").
98 Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d at 622; Page, 232 F.3d at 541; Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at
199-200; Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888.
99 United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2001); Li, 206 F.3d at 63-66; see
Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 197 ("State Department has consistently taken the position that the
Vienna Convention does not establish rights of individuals, but only state-to-state rights and obli-
gations" and that its "view of treaty interpretation is entitled to substantial deference."); Lombera-
Carmolinga, 206 F.3d at 887 ("The State Department indicates that it has historically enforced the
Vienna Convention itself, investigating reports of violations and apologizing to foreign govern-
ments and working with domestic law enforcement to prevent future violations when necessary.").
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sion "are diplomatic, political, or exist between states under international
law. , , "0
b. Reversal of Conviction and Appellate Standards of
Review
Some courts have observed that even if suppression of the evidence
or dismissal of the indictment were available as remedies in some cases in-
volving violations of Article 36, the defendant would have to demonstrate
prejudice, and none was established in those cases.01 While the cases con-
tain no meaningful discussion of precisely what prejudice a defendant must
show, they make clear that the burden falls squarely on the defendant to
demonstrate it. 10 2 In one case, in support of its determination that no preju-
too Li, 206 F.3d at 63; Emuegbunam. 268 F.3d at 392; Page, 232 F.3d at 541. The court in
Lombera-Camorlinga gave the following explanation for rejecting the suppression of evidence as
a remedy for a violation of Article 36:
The State Department indicates that it has historically enforced the Vienna
Convention itself, investigating reports of violations and apologizing to for-
eign governments and working with domestic law enforcement to prevent fu-
ture violations when necessary. The addition of a judicial enforcement
mechanism contains the possibility for conflict between the respective powers
of the executive and judicial branches. Moreover, the fact that the State De-
partment is willing to and in fact does work directly with law enforcement to
ensure compliance detracts ... from the traditional justification for the exclu-
sionary rule: that it is the only available method of controlling police miscon-
duct.
206 F.3d at 887-88. See Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 394 (A determination that a judicially en-
forceable mechanism exists "risks aggrandizing the power of the judiciary and interfering in the
nation's foreign affairs, the conduct of which the Constitution reserves for the political
branches.").
101 See Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d at 987 ("[E]ven if suppression were an appropriate remedy
for a violation of the Vienna Convention, it would not be appropriate in this case because [defen-
dant] has not demonstrated he was prejudiced by a violation of the treaty."); Cordoba-Mosquera,
212 F.3d at 1196 ("Even if the remedies requested by defendants may be available in some cases
involving Article 36 violations, those remedies are not available absent a showing of prejudice.");
United States v. Doe, 201 F.3d 437 (table), 1999 WL 691842 *1 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[Defendant] had
the burden of establishing that she was prejudiced by the Government's failure to notify her of her
rights under Article 36... and. .. [she] did not establish prejudice."); United States v. Ediale, 201
F.3d 438 (table), 1999 WL 991435 *1 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[R]ights created by international treaties
do not create rights equivalent to constitutional rights. [Defendant] therefore must establish preju-
dice to prevail."); Salas, 1998 WL 911731 at *3 ("Although [defendant] contends that had he been
informed of his right under Article 36 he would have exercised it, he has not asserted how the
failure would have affected the outcome of his case."); see also Li, 206 F.3d at 78 (Torruella, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting in part) ("I would hold that the exclusionary rule may be an appropriate
remedy, at least where the defendant alien can demonstrate prejudice from the violation of his
treaty rights.").
102 See Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d at 987 ("[Defendant] has not demonstrated he was preju-
diced by a violation of the treaty."); Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d at 1196 ("Defendants have not
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dice was established, the court found significant that defendant had been
raised primarily in the United States, that he understood his constitutional
rights and was generally familiar with the criminal process, and that the dis-
trict court had not credited his assertion that he would have contacted his
consulate had he been made aware of his Article 36 rights.
10 3
Circuit courts also have found that reversal of a conviction is not an
appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation because the Vienna Conven-
tion does not create individually enforceable rights. 1 4 But assuming that the
Vienna Convention creates individually enforceable rights, courts have up-
held convictions under the plain and harmless error standards of review.
Before turning to a discussion of these cases, a brief description of the dif-
ference in these standards of review is instructive.
Broadly speaking, alleged errors at trial are reviewed by courts of
appeal under the plain and harmless error standards of review. When the
error asserted on appeal was not raised below, the appellate court examines
the challenge under the plain error standard of review. 10 5 In United States v.
Olano,106 the Supreme Court set forth the limitations on an appellate court's
ability "to correct an error not raised at trial [holding that] there must be (1)
'error,' (2) that is 'plain,' and (3) that 'affect[s] substantial rights."" 10 7 Even
"[i]f all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its
discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error 'seriously af-
fect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.""1
0 8
That condition is not likely to be met where the evidence against a defendant
is "overwhelming." 109
The harmless error standard applies when the defendant raised the is-
sue at trial but lost. This standard is more favorable to the defendant and
requires a demonstration of error that "affect[s] substantial rights"; in other
identified how the government's alleged failure to comply with Article 36 prejudiced them in any
way."); Doe, 1999 WL 691842 at *1 ("[Defendant] had the burden of establishing ... preju-
dice[.]").
103 See Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d at 988.
104 See Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 394 (holding that reversal of a conviction is inappropriate
remedy for Article 36 violation because the Vienna Convention does not create a judicially en-
forceable right).
105 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) states: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be
noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."
106 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
107 Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732).
108 Johnson, 520 U.S. at 462 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
109 Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470.
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words, error that is prejudicial."10 In contrast to plain error, it is the govern-
ment, and not the defendant, who bears the burden of persuasion as to lack of
prejudice."' There are two types of harmless error - constitutional and non-
constitutional.
When the error complained of is constitutional in nature but does
not amount to a "structural defect affecting the framework within which the
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself,"' 1 2 the
test under Chapman v. California1 3 is whether the reviewing court is "able
to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."' 14 As noted above, the burden is on the government to establish that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."15
The nonconstitutional harmless error standard, a less exacting stan-
dard,1 16 is set forth in Kotteakos v. United States" 7 and asks whether the er-
ror had a "substantial influence" on the outcome of the trial." 8 If the review-
110 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) states: "Any error, defect, or irregularity which does not affect sub-
stantial rights shall be disregarded." See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731, 734.
III See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (noting how on plain error review, "[i]t is the defendant rather
than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.").
112 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). As explained by the Court in Fulmi-
nante, there is a certain category of constitutional errors not subject to harmless error analysis
because they represent "structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism[.]" Id. at 309.
Examples of such constitutional errors include the deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, e.g.,
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); a biased judge, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927); unlawful exclusion of members of a defendant's race from the grand jury, e.g., Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986); the right to a public trial, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49
n.9 (1984); and the right to represent oneself at trial, McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78
(1984). In those cases, the conviction is automatically reversal.
113 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
114 Id. at 24.
115 Id.
116 See 3A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §
855, at 335 (2d ed. 1982) ("The test announced in Chapman for determining when a constitutional
error is harmless is more exacting that the test for harmlessness of errors that are not of constitu-
tional dimension.").
117 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
118 Id. at 765. As explained by the Court in Kotteakos:
[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was
not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that sub-
stantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there
was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It
is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if
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ing court "has great doubt about whether an error affected a jury in this way,
the judge must treat the error as if it did so. ' 119 We now turn to the cases
that have applied the plain and harmless error standards of review to appeals
where defendants have challenged their convictions on the basis of alleged
violations of Article 36.
c. Application of the Plain Error Standard
One case illustrative of plain error analysis is United States v. Ade-
maj.120 In Ademaj, the defendant, an Albanian national, was convicted of
several drug-related offenses. 121 When challenging his conviction on appeal,
he argued for the first time that his Fifth Amendment rights to due process
had been violated because he was never advised of his right to request assis-
tance from the local Albanian consulate in his defense. 12 2 Applying Olano
and cases in the First Circuit interpreting it, the court ruled that the defen-
dant failed to show how Albanian Consul would have assisted him or "that
any material due-process right was infringed by the failure to notify the Con-
sul.' ' 123 Additionally, the court found significant that the "Vienna Conven-
tion itself prescribe[d] no judicial remedy or other recourse for its violation,
let alone vacatur of a conviction."'' 24 In light of these factors, the court de-
clined to find plain error in the government's failure to advise defendant of
his right to consular notification.
Another case where the court applied plain error analysis is United
States v. Chanthandara.2 5 There, the defendant, a Laotian national, argued
in a post-trial motion that the government's failure to advise him of his
rights under Article 36 violated the Vienna Convention and constituted re-
versible error. 126 Reviewing this contention under the plain error standard of
review (since defendant raised the issue for the first time after trial), the
court ruled that no such error was established since defendant spoke English,
had lived in the United States since he was six years old, had "no link to
Laos other than technical citizenship," and had "never requested officials to
contact the Laotian consulate."'
' 27
119 O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 438 (1995) (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65).
120 170 F.3d 58 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 887 (1999).
121 Id. at 61.
122 Id. at 66-67.
123 Id. at 67.
124 Id.
125 230 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2000).
126 Id. at 1255.
127 Id. at 1256.
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d. Application of the Harmless Error
Standard
A case illustrating the application of the constitutional harmless error
standard is United States v. Santos.128 Four days after his arrest for charges
relating to the possession and sale of false identification documents (but five
months before he was tried), and following a confession elicited after he
waived his Miranda rights, defendant was advised of his right to have the
Mexican consulate notified of his arrest. 29 He declined consular notification
and thereafter moved to suppress his statement on the ground it was obtained
in violation of the Vienna Convention.' The district court denied the mo-
tion, the defendant was convicted, and he subsequently appealed his convic-
tion. '3
The circuit court assumed, for purposes of argument, that the defen-
dant had an individually enforceable right to consular notification, that the
government's violation of that right rendered his confession involuntary, and
that the appropriate remedy was suppression of the confession. 32 Neverthe-
less, in light of the "overwhelming evidence" of guilt,1 33 the court, applying
constitutional harmless error analysis, found that "any error in admitting
[defendant's] statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' 134
128 235 F.3d at 1105 (8th Cir. 2000).
129 Id. at 1107.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 1108.
133 Id. The court noted that the government had not "limit[ed] itself to a smoking gun - it
introduced an entire arsenal" of evidence against defendant. Id.
134 Id. In support of its holding, the court relied on Fulminante, where the Supreme Court ruled
that the erroneous admission of an involuntary confession does not require reversal if, upon re-
view of the remainder of the evidence, the court is satisfied that "the admission of the confession
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 499 U.S. at 310. As to defendant's contention that the
four-day delay was a "structural defect" analogous to the right to counsel in Gideon, the court in
Santos found that "[e]ven if the Vienna Convention creates an enforceable right to consular par-
ticipation in his trial, five months was more than enough for [defendant] to exercise it, and his
own failure to do so c[ould] not fairly be charged to the government's four-day delay." 235 F.3d
at 1108; see also Polanco v. United States, Nos. 99 Civ. 5739 (CSH), 94 CR. 453 (CSH), 2000
WL 1072303, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2000) (in context of motion to vacate under 22 U.S.C. § 2255,
court recognizes that "a violation of the Vienna Convention's consular notice provision does not
constitute a constitutional violation or a fundamental defect in the conduct of [the] trial"). See
generally Luna & Sylvester, supra note 28, at 157 (noting that argument equating denial of Vi-
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4. Consular Notification Challenges Under Article 36 on
Collateral Attack
Several cases have involved collateral post-conviction attacks for
failure to advise the defendant of his right to consular notification under Ar-
ticle 36. The leading case involving the assertion of an Article 36 claim by a
state prisoner on habeas corpus in federal court is Breard v. Greene.'
35
In Breard, the Supreme Court held that the claim by the defendant
was procedurally barred because it had not been raised in the state proceed-
ings. The Court in Breard went on to state, citing Fulminante,37 that even
if the defendant had not procedurally defaulted on the claim, it "[was] ex-
tremely doubtful that the violation should result in the overturning of a final
judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an ef-
fect on the trial."'138 In other cases dealing with state prisoners seeking fed-
eral relief through habeas corpus, where there has been no procedural de-
fault, courts similarly have found that the failure to demonstrate prejudice
bars relief.
139
Federal prisoners seeking collateral relief for Article 36 violations
135 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
136 Id. at 375-76.
137 The reference to Fulminante has led some commentators to note that "[i]n dicta, the Su-
preme Court... approved a 'harmless error' standard for violations of the Vienna Convention[.]"
Luna & Sylvester, supra note 28, at 149.
138 As the Court in Breard explained:
[Defendant] decided not to plead guilty and to testify at his own trial contrary
to the advice of his attorneys, who were likely far better able to explain the
United States legal system to him than any consular official would have been.
[Defendant's] asserted prejudice - that had the Vienna Convention been fol-
lowed, he would have accepted the State's offer to forgo the death penalty in
return for a plea of guilty - is far more speculative than the claims of prejudice
courts routinely reject in those cases where an inmate alleges that his plea of
guilty was infected by attorney error.
523 U.S. at 377; see Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100 (noting that in addition to claim being procedurally
barred, defendant also "failed to establish prejudice from the alleged violation of the Vienna Con-
vention because he [was] unable to explain how contacting the Mexican consulate would have
changed either his guilty plea or his sentence"); see also Villapuerte v. Stewart, 142 F.3d 1124,
1125 (9th Cir. 1998) (defendant failed to bring up Article 36 claim until his third petition seeking
post-conviction relief.).
139 See Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 995 (1996) (as-
suming the Vienna Convention confers rights enforceable by individuals, violation of Article 36
did not merit reversal of conviction); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 457-58 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 987 (2000) (interpreting Faulder); Mani v. VanZandt, No. 89 CIV. 0554, 1989
WL 52308 *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1989) ("Petitioner's general assertion does not indicate how any
constitutional right [was] violated. [Petitioner] gives no indication of what the Jordanian diplo-
matic officials could have done for him, or how he was in any way prejudiced by this.").
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have met the same fate. In Polanco v. United States,14° for example, the
defendant, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was convicted of drug-
related offenses following a bench trial. 141 Thereafter, he filed a motion for a
new trial which the district court denied. 1
42
On appeal, defendant challenged the denial of his motion for a new
trial. 43 The Second Circuit affirmed the ruling denying the motion and de-
fendant then filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging, inter
alia, that the arresting officer's failure to advise him of his rights to contact
consular officials deprived him of due process. 144
In rejecting the petition, the district court preliminarily questioned
whether a violation of Article 36 was cognizable in collateral attack, since
"[i]t is well-established that only claims involving a lack of jurisdiction, er-
rors of constitutional dimension or an error of law or fact that constitutes 'a
fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice' are properly reviewable on habeas corpus."' 145 The court then went
on to find that assuming such a violation was cognizable, defendant had
failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice for the failure to raise it on ap-
peal. 146
Specifically, the court rejected the contention that defendant was
prejudiced because had he been assisted by consular officials, he "would
have somehow changed his decision to waive his right to a trial by jury.' 47
The court found that defendant had been represented by an experienced
criminal lawyer and assisted by interpreters throughout the proceedings.
148
Furthermore, defendant had not explained how the advice consular officials
would have provided to him regarding the consequences of a jury waiver
would have been better or different from that given by his counsel, nor had
defendant identified other areas where consular assistance would have sig-
nificantly affected the manner in which the defense was conducted. 49 In
light of all of these circumstances, the district court ruled that the defendant
140 Polanco v. United States, No. 95 Civ. 3779, 2000 WL 1072303 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2000).
141 Id. at * 1.
142 Id.
143 Id. at *2.
144 Id.
145 Id. at *6 (quoting United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2nd Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
omitted)).
146 Id. at *6-*8; see United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-69 (1982).
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had not shown any prejudice and denied the petition. 150
C. Synthesis of Federal Criminal Cases Addressing Article 36 Violations
The evolving federal case law makes clear that a challenge to a
prosecution by a defendant (who is a foreign national) on the grounds that
the government violated the consular notification provision found in Article
36 will be unavailing. Before identifying some principles which have
emerged from the cases, it is useful to recognize two general points relating
to the nature an Article 36 violation.
First, courts have explicitly 151 and implicitly 52 rejected the argu-
ment that the failure to advise a foreign national that he has the right to have
consul notified of the arrest and to communicate with consul, amounts to a
fundamental defect in the conduct of the proceedings. 53  Specifically, the
15o Id. at *8; see also Gomez v. United States, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1049 (D.S.D. 2000) (de-
fendant failed to establish the requisite cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default but
even if claim was reviewable, he failed to demonstrate how any alleged violation of the Vienna
Convention prejudiced him). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on counsel's failure
to file a motion to suppress based on an alleged violation of Article 36, or counsel's failure to
request that U.S. government officials inform consul of the defendant's arrest, or to advise the
client of the right to consular notification, have fared no better in collateral attack. See, e.g.,
Gregory v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 2d 441, 450-51 (E.D. Va. 2000); Hurtado v. United States,
No. Civ. 409, 2000 WL 890189 at *3-*5 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2000); Bennett v. United States, No.
99 Civ. 4481, 2000 WL 10213 at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2000); United States v. Arango, No. 99
Civ. 3726, 1999 WL 1495422 at *3-*4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1999).
151 See Santos, 235 F.3d at 1108 (In rejecting defendant's contention that the four-day delay
was a "structural defect" analogous to the right to counsel in Gideon, the court found that "[e]ven
if the Vienna Convention creates an enforceable right to consular participation in his trial, five
months was more than enough for [defendant] to exercise it, and his own failure to do so c[ould]
not fairly be charged to the government's four-day delay."); Polanco, 2000 WL 1072303, at *3;
see also supra note 134.
152 See supra notes 77 & 92 (identifying cases rejecting dismissal of indictment as appropriate
remedy for Article 36 violation).
153 As discussed previously , the Supreme Court has described such fundamental defects as the
right to counsel at trial, Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335; a biased judge, Tumey, 273 U.S. at 510; unlawful
exclusion of members of a defendant's race from the grand jury, Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 254; the
right to a public trial, Waller, 467 U.S. at 49 n.9; and the fight to represent oneself at trial,
McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 168. One commentator has noted:
A judicial posture that holds that a criminal defendant can receive due process
even though provisions of the Vienna Convention concerning his arrest are
violated presumably views any rights that a defendant may have under the
treaty as special rights, not as fundamental rights of constitutional importance.
Such a posture may make sense, considering that the Vienna Convention
would create "rights" for aliens above and beyond the constitutional safe-
guards afforded to citizens.
Deeken, supra note 56, at 1025. But see Springrose, supra note 73, at 199 (maintaining that "the
right to contact consul is analogous to the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel and to a
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contention that the right to consular notification is analogous to the Constitu-
tional right to counsel has been rebuffed, in part because Article 36(1)(c)
alludes only to the right of the consular officer "to arrange for [the] legal
representation," of the defendant and not to render legal advice.
154
The second general point is that there is no requirement under Arti-
cle 36 of the Vienna Convention that a "detained foreign national be allowed
to speak to his consulate before interrogation commences."1 55 Indeed, even
if a defendant requests that his consul be notified, "[t]here is no prohibition
anywhere in the Convention against continuing to question a foreign national
while awaiting consular contact." 156 With this background in mind, what are
some of the legal principles relating to the assertion of an Article 36 viola-
tion as a defense to a criminal prosecution which have emerged from the
cases?
First, it is not at all apparent that a foreign national has standing to
raise Article 36 defensively in a federal criminal prosecution. 157 But even if
fair trial, and may be implied from the right not to be deprived of liberty except under due process
of law.") (footnotes omitted).
154 Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 993; see CONSULAR NOTIFICATION AND ACCESS, supra
note 17, at 22 (noting that while a consular official is permitted to assist in arranging counsel, he
"may or may not actually choose to take such action" and also, that such an official is "not permit-
ted to practice law in the United States.")
155 Carrillo, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 860; see Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886 ("[T]he treaty
does not link the required consular notification in any way to the commencement of police inter-
rogation."); Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199 (same); Page, 232 F.3d at 541 (same); Ore-Irawa, 78
F. Supp. 2d at 613 (nothing in the Vienna Convention requires advice "immediately upon arrest or
before requesting consent to search."); Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 991 (the treaty estab-
lishes "[n]o right to speak with counsel before agents begin interrogation."). As to the point that
prompt consular notification is critical so that the foreign national can be advised of his constitu-
tional rights, one commentator has observed:
[A]liens already receive such notification of their rights as part of their
Miranda warnings. Also, an argument could be made that since aliens are
presumably less familiar with the legal system in this country, it is necessary
for someone of their own country to explain the importance of any constitu-
tional right that they may waive. However, Miranda is sufficient to provide
this type of protection. Miranda holds that any waiver of constitutional rights
must be done not only voluntarily, but "knowingly and intelligently" as well.
Thus, if a consulate makes contact with an arrested alien of his country after
questioning, it is hard to see how the alien is prejudiced, since Miranda lays
down broad, sweeping protections that all individuals in custody enjoy.
Deeken, supra note 56, at 1028-29 (footnotes omitted).
156 Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 184; see Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886 ("Nor does the
treaty, as Miranda, require law enforcement officials to cease interrogation once the arrestee in-
vokes his right."); Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199 (same); Page, 232 F.3d at 541 (same); Alva-
rado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 993 ("[N]othing in the Convention requires officers to delay an
interrogation even if a foreign national requests that officers notify the consul of his arrest.")
157 See, e.g., Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 394 (violation of Article 36 does not create a judicially
[Vol. 105
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he does, the overwhelming majority of the courts consider dismissal of the
indictment or suppression of evidence (for example, a defendant's statement)
inappropriate remedies for an Article 36 violation.1 58 Second, to the extent a
few courts have left open the possibility of suppression of evidence as a
remedy for a violation of Article 36, the burden is on the defendant to estab-
lish prejudice. 159 And when a foreign national has knowingly and voluntar-
ily waived his Miranda rights, it is highly improbable that such a burden
could be met.' 6° Third, a defendant who does not raise an Article 36 viola-
tion directly in his or her prosecution will face a grave challenge in meeting
the procedural default standard on collateral attack.' 6' Finally, the standard
enforceable right; therefore, vacation of conviction is not an appropriate remedy); Jimenez-Nava,
243 F.3d at 198 (Vienna Convention does not create "judicially enforceable rights of consultation
between a detained foreign national and his consular officer."); see also Minjares-Alvarez, 264
F.3d at 986 ("It remains an open question whether the Vienna Convention gives rise to any indi-
vidually enforceable right."); Li, 206 F.3d at 62 ("[I]t is far from clear that the Vienna Convention
confers any rights upon criminal defendants.")
158 See supra notes 77 & 91.
159 See supra note 89. As noted by two commentators:
Treaty-based rights . . . have historically been considered the equivalent of
those found in federal statutes. Once this is conceded, the judiciary's interpre-
tation of rights under the Vienna Convention is wholly consistent with crimi-
nal procedure jurisprudence. Unless a statute provides otherwise, the denial of
a non-constitutional right is typically analyzed by the trial court under the ru-
bric of prejudice - whether the violation has a substantial and injurious effect
on a defendant's case.
Luna & Sylvester, supra note 28, at 180.
160 See, e.g., Ore-Irawa, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 613 ("[Tlhe fact that the defendant was advised of
his rights under Miranda before consent to search was requested of him seriously undermines any
claim of prejudice."); Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 184 ("Prejudice has never been - nor could
reasonably be - found where a foreign national was given, understood, and waived his or her
Miranda rights. Courts have uniformly found that no prejudice can exist in that situation, because
the advice a consular official would give would simply augment the content of Miranda, which
the foreign national has already waived."); Alvarado-Torres, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 990 ("[B]ecause
agents informed Defendant of her Miranda rights, which she understood, Defendant cannot estab-
lish prejudice on the grounds that the consul did not readvise her of virtually the same rights.")
(footnote omitted); see also Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199 ("[W]here Miranda warnings have
been given, three times no less, we will not create a rule that increases the risk that a guilty defen-
dant, who is aware of his rights under the U.S. Constitution and as articulated by the Supreme
Court, go free."); Ediale, 201 F.3d at 438. ("[Defendant] concedes that the FBI agents advised him
of his rights under Miranda... and that he signed a waiver stating that he understood those rights.
[Defendant] does not demonstrate how assistance from the Nigerian Consulate would have af-
fected the outcome of his trial.")
161 In Breard, the Supreme Court pointed out how under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, enacted in 1996, "a habeas petitioner alleging that he is held in violation of 'treaties
of the United States' will, as a general rule, not be afforded an evidentiary hearing if he 'has failed
to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings."' 523 U.S. at 376 (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) & (e)(2)).
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of appellate review governing a conviction where the defendant raised the
issue of an Article 36 violation below would appear to be the one found in
Kotteakos, which applies to non-constitutional error.
162
VI. CONCLUSION
Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, the United States is ob-
ligated to advise foreign nationals who are detained or arrested that they
have the right to have their consul notified of this event and also to commu-
nicate with the consul. Enforcement of this obligation is called for by the
plain terms of the treaty 163 and makes the case stronger for the United States
when it seeks to obtain access to its nationals abroad when they become en-
tangled in criminal matters.I 64
The State Department's 1998 publication regarding consular notifi-
cation and access, and the Department of Justice regulations relating to the
same, demonstrate a commitment on the part of the United States govern-
ment to abide by its obligations under Article 36. Indeed, the State Depart-
ment has published a card captioned "Consular Notification and Access Ref-
erence Card: Instructions for Arrests and Detention of Foreign Nationals"
which summarizes the basic consular notification procedures. 165 The card
provides suggested statements to be read to arrested or detained foreign na-
tionals regarding consular notification, depending upon whether such notifi-
cation is or is not mandatory.' 66 Nonetheless, there will be numerous in-
162 A defendant could make the argument that one of the factors to consider in assessing the
voluntariness of a confession under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) is whether he was advised of his right to
have consul notified of his arrest and to contact consul. See United States v. Cebreros-Barraza, 4
Fed. Appx. 492, 492 (9th Cir. 2001). If a court on appeal were to rule, or assume for purposes of
argument, that failure to advise a defendant of his right to consular notification rendered his con-
fession involuntary, such error would be analyzed under the Chapman standard of review. See
Santos, 235 F.3d at 1107-08.
163 See Aceves, supra note 10, at 314 ("[T]he United States must comply with its treaty obliga-
tions. Quite simply, the United States signed and duly ratified the Vienna Convention. If the
United States seeks to affirm the rule of law in both word and deed, it must comply with and fully
implement its international obligations.")
164 See generally Hanna, supra note 3, at 177 ("If the United States wishes foreign countries to
honor the rights of its citizens under the Vienna Convention, it must honor the fights of foreign
nationals in the American judicial system as well."); Schiffman, supra note 11, at 60 ("On the
international plane, the U.S. is likely to incur a reciprocal loss of protection for its own nationals
abroad as well as liability before international tribunals unless its compliance with Article 36
improves.")
165 See Consular Notification and Access Reference Card: Instructions for Arrests and Deten-
tion of Foreign Nationals (Feb. 1998).
166 See Vienna Convention, supra note 1. For example, with respect to cases where consular
notification is at the foreign national's option, the card suggests the following statement:
[Vol. 105
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stances where foreign nationals who are criminally prosecuted are advised of
their right to consular notification, if at all, only after the prosecution is un-
derway or perhaps even completed. As the evolving federal criminal law
makes clear, the remedy for an Article 36 violation does not appear to in-
clude any action that would affect the validity of the prosecution and convic-
tion of a defendant. 67 Instead, the remedy is confined to diplomatic and
political interaction, or other action under international law, between the
United States and the country of the foreign national.
68
As a non-U.S. citizen who is being arrested or detained, you are entitled to
have us notify your country's consular representatives here in the United
States. A consular official from your country may be able to help you obtain
legal counsel and may contact your family and visit you in detention, among
other things. If you want us to notify your country's consular officials, you
can request this notification now, or at any time in the future. After your con-
sular officials are notified, they may call or visit you. Do you want us to no-
tify your country's consular official?
Supra note 165.
167 See United States v. Rodrigues, 68 F. Supp. 2d 178, 186 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) ("None of the
almost 200 signatory states allows an Article 36 failure to affect their criminal proceedings in any
way whatsoever. This practice is consistent with the fact and common international understanding
that consular assistance is not essential to the criminal proceeding against the foreign national.")
(quotation omitted).
168 See Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 392; Page, 232 F.3d at 541; Li, 206 F.3d at 63; Rodrigues,
68 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
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